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Partisanship and Taxation:  
An exploratory study of crisis responses 
ABSTRACT 
With the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008, European governments extensively 
intervened to avert a severe economic recession. Taxation is a crucial instrument to 
achieve such economic objectives, but it also represents a redistributive tool in democ-
ratic societies. Generally, left-wing parties are more supportive of progressive taxes and 
redistribution than right-wing governments. As a crisis response, one could assume that 
European governments, especially social-democrats, reinforced a redistributive stance to 
compensate for the substantial amounts of public money used to bail-out financial insti-
tutions. Yet, the internationalisation of capital markets has made it difficult to levy high 
income taxes as it might cause capital flights, less investments and growth. Based on the 
tax reforms introduced between 2008 and 2010, the paper explores how European gov-
ernments mitigated the fiscal stress from the crisis. The findings show that fiscal pres-
sures significantly restrained the policy choices available to governments. 
 
Keywords: Crisis, fiscal stress, economic growth, tax policy, political parties, European 
Union.  
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Partisanship and Taxation:  
An exploratory study of crisis responses  
1. EUROPEAN TAX POLITICS DURING THE CRISIS 
With the outbreak of the global financial and economic crisis in 2008 banks were social-
ised, growth rates declined and unemployment rose. As a consequence, average public 
debt in the European Union (EU) rocketed from 59 per cent in 2007 to 80 per cent of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2010. Rising fiscal stress and a negative economic 
outlook, above all, in particularly indebted countries such as Greece and Latvia, placed 
increased pressure on European governments to adjust their economies. On the one 
hand, they need to consolidate public finances and avert a further slowing down of the 
economy. On the other hand, a substantial amount of public tax money was used to bail-
out financial institutes and thus triggered the demand for redistribution. The aim of the 
paper is to understand if social-democratic and conservative governments have opted 
for different policy measures. Have they been able to mitigate the fiscal pressure stem-
ming from the crisis? 
The paper is of exploratory nature aiming to shed light on the tax policy strategies 
adopted by European governments. An assessment of the entire economic policy re-
sponses is too broad to allow a focused comparison. Moreover, as existing studies pri-
marily address the expenditure side, above all social policy responses (Heise and Lierse 
2011, Watt 2011, Starke et al. 2011) this article concentrates on the revenue side, that is, 
on the tax adjustments. It explores and compares the tax measures adopted by European 
governments since the outbreak of the crisis.  
In 2009 most EU countries offered tax reliefs to stimulate the economy, reversing 
this trend in 2010 by raising taxes due to an increased pressure to consolidate. For in-
stance, after the introduction of some tax benefits in 2009, the Greek government in-
creased the VAT rate by 4 points, hiked the top personal income tax rate by 5 points and 
imposed an extra levy on large profitable corporations (EU Tax Trends 2010). Yet, the 
amounts of adjustments and the kind of tax responses are diverse in the EU. While 
Greece imposed a one-off extra levy on companies and Hungary raised the corporate 
income tax, other governments such as the Netherlands offered tax reliefs to companies 
through special depreciation and exemption rules.  
There are two main sources that can account for the variation in tax policy-making: 
political and economic factors. With regard to the former, one assumes that leftist par-
                                                 
  The author gratefully acknowledges the constructive feedback, the helpful comments and ideas provided by the 
members of the research team “The Tax State and International Tax Policies” at the Jacobs University Bremen. 
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ties react differently than right-wing parties as social-democrats tend to favour a more 
interventionist and redistributive role of the government (Garrett and Mitchell 2001). 
Accordingly, one would argue that the socialist Greek government opted for extra 
charges on corporate and high incomes whereas the conservative government in the 
Netherland implemented more investment-driven tax measures. In turn, a more func-
tionalist approach would focus on differences in macroeconomic performance such as 
the interest rate on bonds or the deficits, which requires different kinds of intervention. 
According to this strand, the Dutch government had room to reduce taxes and to stimu-
late the economy whereas the Greek government was forced to address its unsustainable 
debt levels, thus mainly raising extra charges.  
The next part addresses such theories to explain variations in state activity and tax in-
tervention, in particular. The third part addresses methodological aspects and describes 
the data employed whereas the fourth part discusses the empirical evidence. Based on a 
period of three years from 2008 to 2010 the tax measures of the member states are first, 
analysed from a more quantitative perspective (EU Tax Trends 2010). Different than 
previous research, the dependent variable is not the tax ratio as a percentage of GDP or 
the tax rate. By contrast, the focus is on the policies themselves, the amount and the 
direction of tax adjustments. The advantage of this approach is that it also entails infor-
mation on base changes and can therefore render more comprehensive insights into 
governments’ crisis responses. Second, the tax measures are compared from a more 
qualitative perspective to better understand the content of the reforms. The overall evi-
dence indicates that high fiscal stress severely restrict governments’ capacities to shape 
political intervention. In fact, there is little proof that social-democratic governments 
adopt a more redistributive and interventionist approach to taxation than conservatives. 
2. EXPLAINING VARIATION IN STATE ACTIVITY 
There are only a few studies that directly deal with tax differences among countries 
(Garrett and Mitchell 2001, Swank and Steinmo 2002, Genschel and Schwarz 2011). 
Yet, in general, the comparative public policy literature differentiates between two main 
approaches that explore variations in state intervention in the economy (for an overview 
see Starke 2006, Castels and Obinger 2007): those that highlight the effect of party poli-
tics and domestic institutions on policy outcomes and those that regard functional im-
peratives as the main drivers of change. The following section discusses each strand 
taking into consideration the special circumstance of the crisis.  
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2.1. Party politics and taxation 
The most popular approach that highlights the importance of political parties for eco-
nomic outcomes is the Power Resource Theory (PRT) (Esping-Anderson and Korpi 
1984, Stephens 1979, Huber and Stephens 2001, Bradley et al. 2003). It is based on the 
assumption that different forms and intensities of class organisation affect public policy 
outcomes. Of importance is the left-right composition of governments as they represent 
the interests of different social groups. Lower income groups and labour are regarded as 
favouring a large and active state that regulates the market. In contrast, capital owners 
and high income groups are thought to reject strong economic interventionism and re-
distribution. The idea is that left- and right-wing parties, once they are in power, imple-
ment those policies that serve the interests of the respective electorate (Cusack 1997). 
The original idea was brought forward by Hibbs (1977) who studied whether particu-
lar macroeconomic outcomes are linked to left- and right-wing governments. His main 
argument is that the economic interests of lower income groups are better served by a 
low unemployment-high inflation oriented policy, whereas a more high unemployment-
low inflation stance is preferred by upper income groups. By comparing the policies 
adopted by twelve states Hibbs confirmed his assumption showing that a high unem-
ployment-low inflation pattern is dominant in states that are regularly governed by cen-
tre and rightist cabinets. He therefore concludes that governments tend to pursue macro-
economic policies consistent with the interests of their main target groups. 
More recent studies concur with Hibbs in that domestic politics have an influence on 
how governments react to market pressures (Garrett 1998, Garrett and Mitchell 2001, 
Timmons 2010). Garrett’s (1998) findings show that even though taxes generally be-
came less progressive in the 1980s, the greatest change occurred in countries with 
strong right-wing parties whereas left-wing power is positively correlated with higher 
effective corporate tax rates. Hence, his analysis shows that government composition 
affects the policy choices adopted with left governments opting for more progressive 
and redistributive tax measures. Also Bradley et al.’s study (2003) confirms that leftist 
governments positively affect income redistribution.  
These findings suggest that left-wing governments favour more redistribution 
through higher proportions of public revenue and through a more progressive setup of 
taxes. Quinn and Shapiro (1991) classify the left-wing approach as consumption-
oriented whereas right-wing governments favour an investment-driven approach. Ac-
cordingly, social-democratic governments minimise the burden on low and medium 
incomes as these tend to have a higher marginal propensity to consume. In turn, conser-
vative and liberal governments seek to reduce the tax burden on capital and govern-
ments in the hope that high profits are used for future investments. Hence, social-
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democratic parties are more likely to shift the tax burden from labour to more capital 
intensive factors and vice versa for right-wing governments. 
Although literature tends to highlight the kind of taxes that are preferred by different 
governments, their divergent preferences may also affect the overall number of tax 
changes and the direction of change. Social-democratic governments are often depicted 
as favouring a more interventionist role of the state. This may translate into a more ac-
tive policy stance and higher number of changes to stimulate the economic activity 
through tax reliefs in times of recessions and higher taxes in times of stability and pros-
perity. By contrast, right-wing governments tend to regard the economy as a more self-
regulating entity, which needs less intervention. Hence, we may observe less tax ad-
justments in countries that are governed by a party classified as right-wing (see section 
3). In sum, one can expect that the composition of governments has two potential ef-
fects on the tax crisis adjustment strategy. First, on the overall amount of tax changes 
and second, on the kind of tax, that is, whether the focus is on capital or labour intensive 
factors.  Table 1 provides an overview of the effects.  
2.2. Functionalist theories 
Functionalist scholars regard policy changes as a response to particular socio-economic 
challenges (Genschel 2004, Garrett and Mitchell 2001, Swank and Steinmo 2002). 
These approaches tend to focus on dependences from global economic integration such 
as trade openness and capital liberalisation, which have caused tax competition among 
states. Tax competition was initially thought to have two effects (for an overview see 
Genschel and Schwarz 2011): first, it was thought to lead to lower tax revenues and 
second, it was to bring about a shift in the tax burden from capital and corporate taxes to 
labour and consumption taxes.  
The convergence hypothesis captures the notion that tax competition causes a shift of 
the tax burden (Garrett and Mitchell 2001, Genschel 2004, Scharpf 1991). More explic-
itly, the hypothesis postulates that the exit option of capital has changed the power bal-
ance between markets and politics leaving little choice for governments but to provide 
market-friendly policies (Scharpf 1991, Garrett and Lange 1991). As a result, progres-
sive tax systems are uncompetitive in a global economy and tax policies will conver-
gence around neoliberal ideas. Hence, the functional strand suggested that socio-
economic pressures will shift the tax burden from capital to labour, which would end up 
in less progressive instruments of taxation (Rodrik 1997).  
But to what extent has tax competition caused the convergence of national tax sys-
tems (Genschel 2002, Swank 2006)? Empirical evidence is inconclusive: often the ef-
fects are small and dependent on the specification of the model (Starke 2006, Swank 
2002, Plümper et al. 2009). There are a variety of reasons that account for why the ob-
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servable effect is the smaller than anticipated. First, economic integration also puts 
downward pressure on labour taxes as governments need to secure employment (Swank 
and Steinmo 2002). If labour is comparatively expensive, then (labour-intensive) in-
vestments will be shifted to other regions. In fact, international tax competition is least 
pronounced in the field of indirect taxes (Rixen 2008), which are also considered as less 
growth-deterrent (OECD 2010). A shift of the tax burden from direct to indirect taxes is 
therefore most likely.  
Second, governments have budget rigidities with fixed long-term costs and are there-
fore restricted in lowering taxes. During the course of the recent crisis, European mem-
ber states have faced particularly strong fiscal pressure. Deficits drastically rose, as gov-
ernments bailed-out financial institutions, implemented economic stimulus packages 
and public spending rose due to the recession. While a deficit as such is little damaging, 
government bond rates rocketed for some member states with particularly gloomy eco-
nomic outlooks. For them, loans from the capital market became extremely expensive 
placing pressure on the member states to act and to reduce their long-term debt to regain 
access to cheap international finance. In such circumstances, governments’ priority 
switches to reducing the deficit and they increasingly turn to domestic taxpayers where 
they impose extra levies to discharge their payment obligations.  
Although the crisis represents a general upsurge of fiscal stress, some member states 
were hit particularly hard. To account for differences in fiscal stress, I focus on the 
long-term interest rate on government bonds (see also section 3). For example, Greece 
paid an interest rate of more than 15 per cent in May 2011 and also Lithuania was 
charged about 14.5 and Latvia 13 per cent throughout most of 2009 for ten year matur-
ity bonds (Eurostat 2011). According to the functionalist approach, we can assume, in 
terms the overall number of tax adjustments, that governments with high fiscal stress 
also implement more changes as they face a greater need to adjust the economies to 
newly emerging challenges in general. Moreover, they have more pressure to consoli-
date and are therefore more likely to adopt tax increases. Yet, they are likely to circum-
vent increases in the field of direct taxes, above all corporate taxes, as they face interna-
tional competition.  
Table 1 summarises the arguments of both strands of literature and their possible im-
pact on governments’ tax adjustments strategies. In general, there are three dimensions 
of policy changes that can be affected: the number of tax adjustments, the direction (tax 
cut vs. increase) and the distribution between different kinds of taxes. While govern-
ment composition is likely to only affect two dimensions, from the functionalist strand 
we can expect an impact along all three aspects.  
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Table 1:  Possible effects of political and economic factors on the tax adjustment  
strategies 
Three dimensions of tax 
adjustment strategies: 
Left- vs. Right-wing  
governments  
Functionalist pressures  
(fiscal stress, tax competition) 
The number of tax  
adjustments. 
The left is more interventionist 
and therefore opts for more 
changes than right-wing govern-
ments that regard the economy as 
more self-regulating. 
The more fiscal stress, the more 
changes to align the economy to 
newly emerging challenges. 
The direction of  
adjustment  
(tax increase vs. cut). 
__ 
The more fiscal stress, the more 
do governments implement tax 
increases to fulfil their fiscal obli-
gations. 
The distribution between 
different kinds of taxes. 
The Left attempts to redistribute 
from capital to labour whereas the 
Right attempts to reduce the tax 
burden on capital and corpora-
tions.  
As international tax competition is 
less pronounced in the field of 
indirect taxes, tax increases are 
most likely to take place in this 
field.  
 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The analysis is based on a unique dataset that captures the tax reforms implemented by 
the European member states between 2008 and 2010 (EU Tax Trends 2011). One may 
argue that the data for this period does not suffice to assess government’s crisis reac-
tion; after all, the crisis erupted in 2008 and hence, one needs data from previous years 
to evaluate if a policy change occurred. Although it is true that the crisis started in 2008, 
policy reactions take some time. In fact, in 2008, we only observe two tax changes 
whereas the policy adjustments drastically increase to 82 and 71 in following two years 
(Table 2). In other words, 2008 serves as a reference year. Moreover, the crisis did not 
hit all the member states to the same extent, so that between-country variations also 
serve to validate the argument.  
As highlighted at the outset of the paper, the dependent variable differs significantly 
from most analyses, which focus on the tax revenue or the tax rate. The revenue is par-
ticularly prone to erratic conclusions about governmental decisions as changes can be 
due to multiple reasons such as macroeconomic fluctuations, which are not linked to 
actual policy adjustments. Although tax rates better reflect policy decisions, they dis-
card changes in the tax base and therefore do not provide an all-embracing picture of 
governments’ responses. This analysis therefore explores the number and the directions 
of adjustments, increase versus cuts, of different taxes such as the corporate and the 
personal income tax, consumption taxes and social security contributions. 
The following examples better illustrates the advantage of the data employed. A 
number of member states directly reduced the corporate tax rate such as the Greek, the 
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Slovenian and Swedish government. Yet, various governments also opted for other 
forms of tax reliefs through accelerated depreciation and tax incentives such as the 
Dutch and the Austrian governments (European Tax Trends 2010). If we analysed the 
tax rate, we would not be able to account for such effects whereas the dataset developed 
in this paper takes these changes into consideration and therefore provides a more com-
prehensive account of the policy reactions. Yet, there are also some disadvantages; the 
main one is that the data does not include information about the budgetary impact of the 
reforms. A tax change, no matter how high the fiscal effect, counts the same. In other 
words, whether a government lowers the corporate tax rate by 1 or 5 per cent is not re-
flected in the data. To compensate for this shortage, I include an analysis at the end of 
the next section that better illustrates the kind of changes and the amounts of changes 
implemented during the crisis. 
It is possible to distinguish between different aspects of policy changes (see also Ta-
ble 1). The analysis captures these dimensions and first, assesses how many reforms 
governments have implemented and second, whether they opted for tax cuts or in-
creases. In a third step, the analysis takes into consideration which kind of taxes have 
been adjusted and in which direction. In other words, the interest is not only if govern-
ments mainly opted for tax cuts or increases as a crisis response but also which taxes 
have been subject to increases and decreases, respectively.  
To better understand reasons for such policy changes, the theoretical analysis high-
lighted political and economic factors that are likely to determine tax outcomes. To ac-
count for party differences, I constructed a left-right indicator based on the cabinet seats 
of each government. If green and social-democratic parties, as defined by the Party 
Manifesto Group (Volkens et al. 2011), occupy the majority of cabinet seats, then the 
government is coded as “left”. By contrast, if liberal, conservative or Christian-
democratic parties are in power, then it is coded as “right”.  
To assess the impact of fiscal stress on governments’ reactions, I tested a variety of 
factors. Often the deficit and debt rates are applied to test for the effect of fiscal stress 
(Mitchell and Garrett 2001). Yet, these variables only capture part of the picture. For 
instance, Hungary had an average deficit of 4.1 per cent of GDP between 2008 and 
2010, France of 5.9 and Poland of 6.3 per cent. Nonetheless, the Hungarian government 
had to pay the highest price to obtain money from the financial markets with an average 
interest rate of 8.2 per cent in contrast to France Poland and France with 6 and 3.7 per-
cent, respectively. The bond rates account for other important factors such as the growth 
rates and expectations about future economic developments. To illustrate the effect of 
bonds on governments’ policy reactions, I distinguish between three main categories: 
first, those cases that are below the EU-27 average of 5.1 per cent between 2008 and 
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2010, second, those above this average and third, those that are even above the average 
of the second category (>7 per cent)1.  
To explore how governments reacted to the fiscal pressures emanating from the crisis 
and if left-and right-wing governments have opted for different policies, the research 
proceeds in two steps. First, I conduct a more quantitative examination by assessing 
governments’ reactions based on the political and economic variables just outlined. I 
complement the descriptive statistics of the policy changes with a statistical significance 
test: as the dependent variable is a count measure, a test for the Poisson distribution can 
best capture if the group variations are significant. The test is however, only conducted 
for the total amount of changes and the direction of change (total increases and/or de-
creases). The statistical test for each sub-field such as the VAT or the CIT is not appro-
priate due to a lack of sufficient cases. The quantitative approach is then complemented 
with a more qualitative analysis to better understand the content and the direction of the 
reforms.  
4. TAX RESPONSES TO THE CRISIS: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
In the preceding section guiding indicators were identified to explain and compare tax 
crisis responses between countries. Both government composition and fiscal stress serve 
as a point of references for the empirical analysis. It is not the goal to systematically test 
these theories but rather to use them as focal points to scrutinise the empirical data. 
Such an exploratory approach is particularly suitable as no systematic study exists about 
how governments respond under high fiscal pressures. In a first step, I compare the dif-
ferent tax policy responses based on a more quantitative approach. Second, I discuss the 
content of the reforms in more detail and show what kind of tax reliefs and increases 
have been implemented.  
Although the policy data shows the number and direction of adjustments, it lacks 
more detailed information about reforms. For instance, the fact that Denmark cut the 
personal income tax does not provide any information about who benefits from this 
change. Did the government offer a family relief package, tax credits to the lower in-
come classes or reduce the top income tax rate? Thus, in a second step, the analysis in-
volves a more detailed account of the tax reforms with the aim to better understand the 
actual policy responses.  
                                                 
1  Many studies also control for capital market openness when comparing tax policies. The idea is that 
countries, which are particularly liberalised, are more subject to tax competition. However, this study 
is only based on cases from the European Union, where free capital movement is one of the four main 
freedoms. It therefore seems pointless to distinguish between different degrees of capital openness. 
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4.1. The role of party politics and government composition 
The aim of this section is to understand if a particular crisis response on the revenue 
side is linked to the government composition. In 2010 nineteen member states were 
dominated by a conservative and eight by a social-democratic cabinet. Of both ideologi-
cal positions, about 40 per cent focus on tax increases and 60 per cent plan to mainly 
Table 2: Overview of tax measures by country 
Country Year Gov. Comp. Total Tax Changes Growth Deficit Interest 
  1=right 0=left Total Decrease Increase
% 
of GDP 
% 
of GDP 
10Year 
Bond 
BE 2008-10 1 5 4 1 0.13 -3.77 3.93 
BG 2008-10 0/1 8 5 3 0.30 -2.07 6.06 
CZ 2008-10 1 5 3 2 0.23 -4.43 4.45 
DK 2008-10 1 6 4 2 -1.40 -0.73 3.60 
D 2008-10 1 5 5 0 -0.03 -2.07 3.31 
EE 2008-10 1 5 0 5 -5.30 -1.47 7.37 
IE 2008-10 1 6 2 4 -4.03 -18.00 5.17 
EL 2008-10 1/0 7 1 6 -1.83 -11.90 6.35 
ES 2008-10 0 6 3 3 -0.97 -8.17 3.59 
FR 2008-10 1 4 3 1 -0.43 -5.93 3.67 
IT 2008-10 1 7 6 1 -1.73 -4.23 4.34 
CY 2008-10 0 5 3 2 0.97 -3.47 4.60 
LV 2008-10 1 6 1 5 -7.50 -7.20 9.70 
LT 2008-10 1 9 4 5 -3.50 -6.63 8.39 
LU 2008-10 1 2 2 0 0.43 0.13 4.00 
HU 2008-10 0 12 6 6 -1.83 -11.90 6.35 
MT 2008-10 1 1 1 0 1.87 -3.93 4.85 
NL 2008-10 1 5 5 0 -1.83 -11.90 3.64 
AT 2008-10 0 4 4 0 0.10 -3.20 3.85 
PT 2008-10 0 5 3 2 -0.40 -7.57 4.71 
RO 2008-10 1/0 8 6 2 -0.37 -6.87 8.24 
PO 2008-10 1 5 4 1 3.53 -6.30 6 
SI 2008-10 1/0 7 5 2 -1.07 -4.47 4.43 
SK 2008-10 0/1 6 5 1 1.67 -6.00 4.28 
FI 2008-10 1 8 5 3 -1.40 0.30 4.20 
SE 2008-10 1 5 5 0 -0.13 0.50 3.34 
UK 2008-10 0/1 3 2 1 -1.23 -8.93 3.74 
EU-27 2008 0=8, 1=19 2 2 0 1.39 -2.10 5.08 
EU-27 2009 0=10, 1=17 82 56 26 -5.65 -6.52 5.60 
EU-27 2010 0=8, 1=19 71 39 32 1.62 -6.27 4.66 
EU-27 2008-10 0=26, 1=55 155 97 58 -0.88 -4.96 5.11 
Source: own research based on Eurostat (2011), European Tax Trends (2009, 2010), Volkens et al. (2011), and the 
European Election Database (2011).  
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consolidate through expenditure cuts. The focus on the expenditure side is not surpris-
ing as it is commonly proposed to have more long-lasting consolidation effects than tax 
increases (EU Public Finances 2010). However, they tend to significantly affect lower 
income groups who rely relatively more on public and social spending. In turn, tax in-
creases can be designed to specifically target wealthy groups and capital owners.  
In 2008 very few tax adjustments took place compared to the following two years, 
which is due to the fact that the crisis erupted at end of 2008 and political responses are 
time-lagged (Table 2). The years 2009 and 2010 show a considerable increase in eco-
nomic adjustments independent of the cabinet composition. While left-wing govern-
ments conducted about 8.2, conservative cabinets implemented 7 average changes be-
tween 2008 and 2010. The same is true as regards the average increases and decreases, 
which do not significantly differ. Also the statistical analysis does not confirm that par-
ties opted for different approaches as regards the amount of overall changes and the 
direction of change (Table 3).  
Table 3: Number and Direction of Tax Changes  
 Total Changes Total Increase Total Decreases 
Right-wing government -0.248 (0.165) 
-0.430 
(0.269) 
-0.182 
(0.212) 
Interest rates on bonds  
(10 year maturity) 
0.104* 
(0.030) 
0.227* 
(0.039) 
-0.017 
(0.050) 
Observations 81 81 81 
Standard errors in parentheses, *p<0.01, constant not reported 
Figure 1 goes beyond the level of intervention and evaluates the tax adjustments in 
terms of the direction of change: the data indicate that both, left- and right-wing gov-
ernments reacted with more tax decreases than increases even though social-democrats 
opted for less decreases in total. Although one may argue that this shows that leftist par-
ties support a more active and interventionist approach than rightist parties, the differ-
ence seems trivial. The data rather highlights that social-democratic and conservative 
governments both, actively reacted to the crisis: they opted for a mixed strategy between 
fiscal consolidation and stimulating economic growth. 
The evidence further indicates that the tax approaches are similar between social-
democratic and conservative governments with some differences as regards direct taxes. 
Figure 1 shows that both government setups shifted the burden from direct to indirect 
taxes. On average, consumption taxes and social security contributions (SSC) were in-
creased while corporate (CIT) and personal income taxes (PIT) were adjusted down-
wards. This pattern is the same irrespective of the cabinet composition. Yet, there are 
two interesting differences as regards direct tax changes.  
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Figure 1: Direction* of tax changes according to government composition 
 
Source: own research based on Eurostat (2011), European Tax Trends (2009, 2010), Volkens et al. (2011), and the 
European Election Database (2011).  
Note: * The direction of change is calculated by increase-decrease; hence, a negative number indicates an overall tax 
decrease whereas a positive one indicates an increase. 
First, social-democratic governments adjusted the PIT more upwards than the conserva-
tive ones. This may suggest that left-wing governments took a more redistributive ap-
proach than right-wing governments. While an increase in indirect taxes is regressive, 
an increase in direct taxes can at least potentially have progressive effects. However, to 
assess if this is the case, it is necessary to conduct a more qualitative investigation of the 
measures adopted and to evaluate which social groups are mostly affected by the per-
sonal income tax measures. This is done in section 4. 
Second, social-democratic governments decreased corporate taxes more than their 
counterparts. This does not imply that they directly lowered the corporate tax rate but it 
could involve measures to stimulate incentives for innovation, R&D and accelerated 
depreciation, which are mostly base changes. Nonetheless, the finding that labour par-
ties decreased corporate taxes more than right-wing governments is inconsistent with 
the hypothesis that labour parties redistribute from labour to capital. The evidence rather 
shows that the tax strategies adopted by left- and right-wing governments differ only 
marginally from a quantitative perspective. 
4.2. Functional pressure during the crisis  
This section identifies whether socio-economic pressures better shed light on the tax 
measures adopted by the EU member states. The pressures stemming from declining 
growth rates, rising public debt levels and increasing interest rates on government bonds 
was intense during the crisis. Some countries such as Greece and Portugal have faced 
particularly strong pressures whereas others such as Germany comparatively little. 
Hence, it is likely that different degrees of socio-economic pressure cause different pol-
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icy responses. Those countries that are highly indebted cannot adopt a long-term growth 
strategy based on lowering certain taxes and are therefore more likely to increase taxes 
than those with low debt burdens (section 2.2). 
Figure 2 summarises the number of tax adjustments according to the interest rate on 
ten year maturity bonds of the EU member states. The data illustrate that the level of 
stress is linked to the number of tax changes. They show that governments with high 
interest rates on bonds opted for more tax adjustments and for more increases than those 
with lower ones. For instances, the above 7.0 per cent group implemented on average, 
3.33 changes over three years whereas the below average group only adopted 1.61 
measures. In other words, the higher the bond rates the higher the pressure to adjust 
particularly, based on tax increases. It demonstrates that states with high fiscal stress 
have less room to lower their taxes and therefore need to adopt a more consolidation-
oriented as opposed to a growth-oriented strategy. This finding is confirmed by a statis-
tical analysis, according to which the impact of bond rates on the overall number of 
changes and the amount of tax increases is significant (Table 3).  
Figure 2: Direction* of tax changes according to interest rates on ten year government 
bonds 
 
Source: own research based on Eurostat (2011) and European Tax Trends (2010) 
Notes: * The direction of change is calculated by increase-decrease; hence, a negative number indicates an overall tax 
decrease whereas a positive one indicates an increase; ** Please note that the category above average also accounts 
for the members of the above 7 percent group (see section 3).  
Countries with bond rates above EU-average adjust taxes more upwards than those with 
less fiscal pressure. This tendency is representative for each tax category. Nonetheless, 
Figure 2 shows crucial difference between direct and indirect taxes. As regards direct 
taxes, CIT and PIT, all governments rather lowered than increased them. By contrast, 
SSC and consumption taxes were only lowered in countries with fiscal room whereas 
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governments under high pressure increased them. This finding shows that these coun-
tries also struggle not to lose out in the international competition for investments and 
businesses, keeping direct taxes low.  
Based on a more quantitative approach the crisis reactions are well elucidated by 
functionalist challenges (Sawnk and Steinmo 2002, Genschel 2002, Plümper et al. 
2009). State activity and adjustment processes increase with bond rates. Moreover, the 
results also support that tax competition is highest in the fields of corporate and per-
sonal income taxes as high rates may lead to a capital flight into low-tax regions or to 
comparatively costly employment. Hence, governments for the most part rely on con-
sumption tax increases. 
4.3. Main tax trends and reforms since the crisis 
The previous section demonstrated that on average, there are little differences concern-
ing the tax strategies between social-democratic and conservative governments. How-
ever, some variation exists as left governing parties increased personal income taxes and 
reduced the corporate tax burden more than the conservatives. To understand what kind 
of reforms they implemented and to evaluate whether qualitative differences exist, it is 
crucial to better examine the contents of their reforms. The following section therefore 
discusses the main characteristics of the reforms illustrating them with example.  
Between 2008 and 2010, the majority of tax adjustments took place in the area of di-
rect taxes. For instance, most member states implemented personal income tax changes 
with only three exceptions, the Czech Republic, Cyprus and Malta (Table 2). Most per-
sonal income tax (PIT) reforms involve some form of tax relief and often benefit vari-
ous groups simultaneously such as families, low and high income earners regardless of 
the government composition. For example, Denmark’s centre-right government reduced 
the lowest tax rate from 5.26 to 3.76 per cent whilst cutting the top income tax rate from 
63 to 56 per cent. Certainly, one may argue that this reform is a greater gain for the up-
per class, yet, also the social-democratic government of Austria reduced the tax burden 
in such a way as to benefit the lower and middle-upper classes at the same time and the 
leftist Hungarian governing party even abolished a four per cent solidarity charge for 
high incomes. Hence, tax reliefs were implemented on a broader level irrespective of 
the dominant ideological position of the government.  
With regard to PIT increases both, left- and right-wing governments have raised 
taxes primarily, starting in 2010 when the policy focus shifted from providing growth 
incentives to consolidating public finances. For instance, the Greek and the British gov-
ernments raised the top personal income tax rate in 2010 and others such as Spain, 
France, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and Finland followed suit in 2011 (EU Crisis Tax 
Trends 2011). However, this does not mean that a general trend towards more progres-
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 159) 
- 14 - 
sive tax systems is underway. Particularly in some Eastern European countries the top 
rates were drastically lowered: for example, Lithuania cut the PIT rate to 15 per cent, 
the Hungarian government reduced it from 40 to 16 per cent in 2011 and Poland from 
40 to 32 points (European Tax Trends 2010, EU Crisis Tax Trends 2011). 
The picture that emerges from the reforms undertaken in the field of personal income 
taxes is mixed. It does not reflect a clear direction of either a move towards more pro-
gressive or regressive income tax systems, especially not consistent with a particular 
social-democratic or conservative approach. By contrast, it reflects the current diversity 
of the income tax systems in Europe, which involve highly progressive and flat tax sys-
tems.  
With reference to corporate income taxes, the picture is more coherent as the changes 
generally involve a reduction of the burden. However, also in this area, social-
democratic and conservative governments do not pursue distinctive tax approaches, on 
the whole. A number of left- and right-wing governments directly reduced the tax rate 
such as the Greek, the Slovenian and Swedish or they allowed for accelerated deprecia-
tion and tax incentives for R&D as the Dutch and Austrian governments (European Tax 
Trends 2010). An exception is the Hungarian and the Lithuanian government, which 
increased the tax rate. For instance, Lithuania raised the rate from 15 to 20 and Hungary 
from 16 to 19 per cent. Yet, in Lithuania this was a one-off payment in 2009 and in 
Hungary it was accompanied by abolishing other charges for corporations with high 
incomes. The same is the case in Greece, where an extra charge on large profitable 
companies is accompanied by a gradual reduction of tax rate. In other words, most cor-
porate tax reforms alleviate the burden on companies and the nature of relief, a direct 
cut or an incentive, does not directly depend on a left- or right-wing governing party.  
While the corporate tax adjustments are generally downward, there is a clear upward 
trend in the field of consumption tax rates. The relatively high number of VAT cuts as 
listed stems from lower rates in certain sub-fields such as food, restaurants and hotels, 
construction and renovations but they are not due to a general rate reduction. Only a 
couple of countries reduced the standard VAT rate, namely Ireland (-0.5) and the UK (-
2.5). By contrast, on EU-27 average the VAT rate rose by 2.5 percentage points in only 
three years from 2009 to 2011 (EU Crisis Tax Trends 2011). The highest increases were 
implemented in Hungary and Romania (+5), in Greece (+4) and in Latvia (+3). Similar 
as VAT rates, excise taxes were for the most part increased, particularly those on energy 
products, tobacco and alcohol. Overall, consumption tax rates were drastically raised as 
a response to the crisis, both under social-democratic and conservative governments.  
The qualitative evidence confirms the result of the previous section that leftist parties 
have not responded with more progressive or redistributive tax approaches than right-
wing governments per se. By contrast, we observe that a general shift from direct to 
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indirect taxes has taken place in the EU. This development is consistent with recent 
proposals for a growth-oriented tax approach (OECD 2010). The OECD advocates a 
ranking order of taxes, according to which corporate taxes are most harmful for eco-
nomic growth, followed by the personal income tax and then by consumption taxes: “A 
growth-oriented tax reform would therefore shift part of the tax burden from income to 
consumption (…)” (OECD 2010:10). The tax responses that we observe during the cri-
sis period clearly follow this framework. While there are significant country differences, 
the general reform trend is in line with an investment-driven approach (section 2).  
5. CONCLUSION: FISCAL STRESS AND THE LACK OF POLITICAL CHOICE  
How have European governments mitigated the fiscal pressures stemming from the 
global crisis? At the outset of the paper two main forces were identified that are likely to 
affect economic outcomes: political parties and functionalist pressures. The power re-
source theory suggests that labour parties favour a more progressive and consumption-
driven strategy than right-wing governments that by contrast, support a more invest-
ment-driven approach (section 2.1). Previous studies that account for the relationship 
between government composition and taxation show that government composition can 
significantly affect tax outcomes (Timmons 2010, Garrett and Mitchell 2001). However, 
the findings of this study do not confirm these results but show that the crisis responses 
were mainly structured by functionalist pressures.  
The political orientation of European governments on the whole, does not correspond 
to a party-specific tax adjustment strategy. On the contrary, both left- and right-wing 
governments actively intervened in the economy: while in 2008 very few tax changes 
took place, the number of adjustments drastically increased in the following two years, 
irrespective of the government composition. Initially, they mainly intervened based on 
tax cuts to stimulate economic activity in 2009 while the focused shifted to a more con-
solidation-oriented approach in the following year. Likewise, there is no evidence that 
socio-democratic parties have adopted a more progressive or redistributive policy 
stance. In fact, left-wing governments adopted more corporate tax cuts than conserva-
tives, which is not consistent with the hypotheses that labour parties redistribute from 
labour to capital.  
Also the more qualitative investigation of the reforms did not detect party-specific 
differences as regards the form of tax policies and the way in which the burden is dis-
tributed among different societal groups. In the field of personal income taxes the find-
ing is mixed: a number of countries changed lower and higher level tax brackets, while 
others mainly raised or lowered the top income tax. Some Eastern European countries 
even changed to a flat tax system substantially reducing the burden for high income 
earners. Hence, there is no clear indication whether income taxes have become more or 
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less progressive during the course of the crisis. The evidence in the field of corporate 
and consumption taxes is more homogenous. While the former have a clear downward 
trend, the standard VAT rates have mostly been adjusted upwards suggesting that a shift 
from direct to indirect taxes has taken place.  
The results do not necessarily prove but they certainly suggest that the tax burden has 
been shifted from direct to indirect taxes in the EU. This finding is consistent with the 
growth-driven approach advocated by the OECD (2010) and reflects the attempt to 
safeguard investments and economic growth. Yet, it appears that most governments do 
not compensate such a policy stance with redistributive measures in the field of personal 
income taxes. Certainly, it is possible that redistributive policies were implemented on 
the expenditure side by increasing social security benefits or other transfers. However, 
such transfers are mainly designed to protect people external to the employment market 
whereas taxes can be spread out among different income groups.  
So, do political parties no longer matter in contemporary democracies? It is crucial to 
stress that the evidence does not contradict previous studies, which found differences in 
tax outcomes between social-democratic and conservative governments. Instead the 
analysis shows that we ought to evaluate how national actors respond to external pres-
sures and under which conditions their room for independent strategies diminishes or 
increases respectively. The financial and economic crisis is a situation of particularly 
high fiscal stress, in which governments lack the capacity to act and in turn, functional-
ist pressures drastically shape the tax outcomes. High fiscal stress, expressed in interest 
rates on bonds, does not only determine the amount of tax changes but also the degree 
to which governments need to rely on tax increases as loans from the international capi-
tal markets become too expensive. Yet, tax increases are most likely to be implemented 
in the field of indirect taxes, where international competition is less pronounced. In 
other words, governments responded to fiscal stress and international competition, and 
much less so according to party-specific ideals.  
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